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INTRODUCTION

Since 2017, the "#MeToo" and "TimesUp" movements have
spurred action regarding ending workplace harassment.' As of late,
"state lawmakers across the country have been working to meet the
bravery of the survivors coming forward by enacting meaningful,
substantive policy reforms to stop and prevent sexual harassment." 2
However, despite these state laws expanding workplace protections for
sexual
harassment
victims,
"[t]he
COVID-19 economic
crisis has left workers more desperate to keep a paycheck and, thus,
more vulnerable to workplace harassment, underscoring the urgent need
for stronger workplace
harassment laws. .. .. "3
Even
before the
COVID-19 pandemic upended workplace culture in the United States,
according to a survey conducted by the National Women's Law Center4
1. For example, in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Press Release
dated June 11, 2018, entitled the "EEOC Select Task Force on Harassment Hears from Experts on
How to Prevent Workplace Harassment," Suzanne Hultin of the National Conference of State

Legislatures:
[T]estified that over "125 pieces of legislation have been introduced this year in 32
states." Hultin noted that many states are looking to go beyond federal regulations to
prevent workplace sexual harassment. She projected that proposals to address and
prevent harassment would continue to be a priority for state legislatures this year and
next.
EEOC Select Task Force on Harassment Hears from Experts on How to Prevent Workplace
Harassment, U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N
(June
11,
2018),
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-select-task-force-harassment-hears-experts-how-preventworkplace-harassment.
2. ANDREA JOHNSON ET AL., NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR., PROGRESS IN ADVANCING ME TOO
WORKPLACE
REFORMS
IN
#20STATESBY2020
2
(2019),
https://nwlcciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/20-States-By-2020-report.pdf; see
Andrew R. Turnbull & Cooper J. Spinelli, Is Time Up for the Severe or Pervasive Standard?

Harassment Claims in 2020 and Beyond, MORRISON FOERSTER EMP. L. COMMENT. (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://elc.mofo.com/topics/Is-Time-Up-For-The-Severe-Or-Pervasive-Standard-. html.

3. Samone Ijoma & Andrea Johnson, Maryland Must Join the Movement to Modernize
Workplace Harassment Law,
NAT'L
WOMEN'S
L.
CTR.
(Mar.
24,
2021),
https://nwlc.org/blog/maryland-must-join-the-movement-to-modemize-workplace-harassment-law.
4. The National Women's Law Center, [founded in 1972,] fights for gender justice-in
the courts, in public policy, and in our society-working across the issues that are central
to the lives of women and girls. We use the law in all its forms to change culture and
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published on May 3, 2019, 66% of voters thought it was "important for
Congress to prioritize preventing sexual harassment and assault" and
"90% support[ed] strengthening protections against sexual harassment
5
and sexual violence in the workplace and in schools."
As of today, "[f]rom New York to California to Virginia, there is
growing movement in states and localities to remove harmful barriers
that workplace harassment survivors face when bringing claims against
their employers." 6 For example, California and New York deleted the
severe or pervasive requirement for filing a claim, and a number of other
states and counties considered legislation to do this, as well.
Additionally, numerous states now prohibit or limit employers from
requiring employees to sign nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs") as a
condition of employment or as part of a settlement, prohibit or limit
provisions regarding arbitration agreements, and require anti-harassment
training for employees and employers.' Additionally, other reforms have
included extending protection to individuals beyond employees and
including smaller employers, as well as extending the statute of
limitations to remove barriers to accessing justice, and closing a
loophole in employer liability.'
Despite this positive trend, a considerable amount of work still
needs to be done to ensure that all states protect survivors and ensure
access to justice for those individuals. Specifically, "[o]ne of the ways
community-based organizations are mobilizing around these issues is in
support of legislation that disavows the harmful and outdated requirement
that harassing conduct be 'severe or pervasive' to be considered
unlawful." 9 Thus, one clear-cut way to strengthen access to justice for
victims is to delete the severe or pervasive requirement and establish a
new, less stringent standard for filing a claim, as "[t]he 'severe or
pervasive' standard does not reflect the realities of our workplaces,
power dynamics, or modern understandings of harassment at work and
0
its impacts on those who experience it."'
drive solutions to the gender inequity that shapes our society and to break down the
barriers that harm all of us-especially women of color, LGBTQ people, and lowincome women and families. For nearly 60 years, we have been on the leading edge of
every major legal and policy victory for women.
About, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR, https://nwlc.org/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
5. NWLC Survey Finds Overwhelming Support for Gender Justice Policies, NAT'L
WOMEN'S L. CTR. (May 3, 2019), https://nwlc.org/resources/nwlc-survey-finds-overwhelming-

support-for-gender-justice-policies.
6.
7.

Ijoma & Johnson, supra note 3.
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.

8. Id. at 5, 9-10.
9.

10.

Ijoma & Johnson, supra note 3.

Id.
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Therefore, this Article will discuss that although the federal
government can and should minimize the "severe or pervasive" standard,
states and local governments should lead this charge to ensure that their
citizens have adequate access to justice for sexual harassment and
discrimination claims, and to put would-be harassers on notice that
harassment and discrimination will not be tolerated. The Article will
begin by discussing the origins of sexual harassment and discrimination
protection, and specifically, the "severe or pervasive" standard." Next, it
will address how certain states and local jurisdictions have removed
and/or replaced the "severe or pervasive" standard with a more sensible
and up-to-date standard.' Then, the Article will address that although
eliminating NDAs and prohibiting mandatory arbitration provisions are
positive changes, these changes are not enough. Finally, the Article will
argue that it is imperative that all states enact laws to change the "severe
or pervasive" standard to a less stringent and more realistic, current
standard.'
II. ORIGINS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION
PROTECTION AND, SPECIFICALLY, THE "SEVERE OR PERVASIVE"
STANDARD

There is a rich statutory and case law history leading to the current
"severe or pervasive" standard for sexual harassment claims. The
beginnings of workplace protections for women took shape in 1963
when Congress passed the Equal Pay Act, "which protects men and
women who perform substantially equal work in the same establishment
from sex-based wage discrimination."" The following year, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") was enacted.' 5 The basis for
sexual harassment claims originates with Title VII, as Title VII
specifically states that:
-

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
11.

See infra Part II.

12. See infra Part 11I.
13.

See infra Part V.

14. Timeline of Important EEOC Events, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N
https://www.ecoc.gov/youth/timeline-important-eoc-events (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1964).
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individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
16
religion, sex, or national origin.

Thus, Title VII provides the basis for protection from sexual
7
harassment and discrimination." Although it does not itself lay out
specific language regarding the protections afforded for sexual
harassment and discrimination, it does explicitly prohibit employment
8
discrimination based on one's sex. Generally, Title VII attempts to
9
remove "arbitrary barriers to sexual equality at the workplace"1 and is
specifically designed to protect an individual from being discriminated
against "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment." 20
In 1965, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") was established to enforce the requirements set out in Title
VII. 21 Specifically, "[t]he U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make
it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because
of the person's ... sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual
orientation) .... "22
On January 14, 2015, the EEOC held a public meeting entitled
"Harassment in the Workplace," with the purpose of the meeting being
to "examine the issue of workplace harassment[-]its prevalence, its
causes, and strategies for prevention and effective response. At the start
of that meeting, EEOC Chair Jenny R. Yang announced the formation of
EEOC's Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace
23
("the Select Task Force")." In Chair Yang's Opening Statement at that
Harassment in the Workplace Meeting ("Workplace Harassment
Meeting") of the EEOC, she stated that the goal of the Select Task Force
was to:

16. See id. ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees."); see also Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm (last visited Oct. 13,

2021).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Id.
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Timeline of Important EEOC Events, supra note 14.
EMP.
EQUAL
U.S.
Overview,

OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
23. CHAT R. FELDBLUM & vICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2016).
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[C]onvene experts across the employer, employee, human resources,
academic, and other communities to identify strategies to prevent and
remedy harassment in the workplace. Through this task force, we hope
to reach more workers so they understand their rights and also to reach
more in the employer community so we can understand the challenge
that they face and promote some of the best practices that we've seen
working. 24

After the Select Task Force was assembled, they spent the next
eighteen months holding a series of meetings (some public, some closed
work sessions, and some private), receiving testimony from witnesses
and numerous public comments. 25 As a result, in June 2016, the
Co-Chairs of the EEOC's Select Task Force, Chai R. Feldblum and
Victoria A. Lipnic, presented the Report of the Co-Chairs of the EEOC
Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace
("EEOC Report"). 26 The Preface of EEOC Report began by highlighting
that although over thirty years ago, in Meritor v. Savings Bank, "the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized claims for sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964" and "[i]n the years that followed, courts have filled in the legal
landscape even further," that "[s]ix years ago, when we came to EEOC
as commissioners, we were struck by how many cases of sexual
harassment EEOC continues to deal with every year." 27
In 2018, the Select Task Force met again "to hear from expert
witnesses on
'Transforming #MeToo Into Harassment-Free
Workplaces' at a meeting open to the public."2 The Acting EEOC
Chair, Victoria Lipnic, stated that the 2016 EEOC Report "laid the
groundwork for the launch of a renewed effort to prevent harassment." 2 9
During that meeting, "[l]egal scholars and attorneys who represent
workers and employers highlighted a range of issues raised in the wake
of high-profile allegations of sexual harassment since October 2017 and
the rise in the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements." 30 Some of the issues
raised included: the benefits of arbitration; the potential for a
counterproductive result if NDAs are prohibited, as they could lead to
24.

See id.; see also Kristy D'Angelo-Corkcr, Don't Call Me Sweetheart! Why the ABA's New

Rule Addressing Harassmentand DiscriminationIs So Importantfor Women Working in The Legal
Profession Today, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 263, 275 (2019).
25. FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 23.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. EEOC Select Task Force on Harassment Hears from Experts on How to Prevent
Workplace Harassment, supra note 1.

29.
30.

Id.
Id.
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increased litigation rather than private resolution; the fact that many state
legislatures have introduced proposals addressing sexual harassment; the
strategies developed to promote a workplace free of harassing conduct;
31
and the need for sexual harassment training. Thus, the meeting
reviewed many of the current strategies being used to combat sexual
harassment and discrimination in order to determine next steps or areas
of improvement.
Notably, according to the EEOC, in 2020, all charges alleging
harassment totaled over 24,000.32 Over the years, the number of sexual
harassment claims filed with the EEOC has remained steady," such that
11,497 sex-based harassment charges were filed in fiscal year 2020, and
the charges filed in fiscal years 2010 through 2020 similarly ranged
between 11,000 to just over 13,000.34 Of the charges filed in 2020, 6,587
5
with those charges
of those specifically alleged sexual harassment
36
resulting in monetary benefits totaling $65.3 million. On average, only
approximately sixteen to just under eighteen percent of the claims are
37
brought by males, indicating that a large majority of the claims are
brought by women. Thus, there is a clear need to protect women in the
workplace, as sexual harassment and discrimination are still prevalent.
Thus, according to the EEOC's Fact Sheet on Sexual Harassment
("EEOC Fact Sheet"), sexual harassment is defined
Discrimination
and
as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual
harassment when submission to or rejection of this conduct explicitly
or implicitly affects an individual's employment, unreasonably
interferes with an individual's work performance or creates an
38
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.

The EEOC Fact Sheet explicitly outlines that:
31. Id.
32. All Charges Alleging Harassment (Chargesfiled with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2020, U.S.
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/all-charges-allegingCOMM'N,
OPPORTUNITY
EQUAL EMP.
20
10-fy- 2 020 (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The EEOC Report Executive Summary highlighted that "[w]orkplace [h]arassment
[r]emains a [p]ersistent [p]roblem" and went on to note that as of the total number of harassment
charges received in 2015, "that alleged harassment from employees working for private employers
or for state and local government employers, approximately . .. 45% alleged harassment on the
basis of sex." FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 23.

36. All Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Chargesfiled with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY

2020, supra note 32.

37. Id.
38.

FactsAbout Sexual Harassment, supra note 16.
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Sexual harassment can occur in a variety of circumstances, including
but not limited to the following:
" The victim, as well as the harasser, may be a woman or a man.
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex.
* The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, an agent of the
employer, a supervisor in another area, a co-worker, or a
non-employee.
* The victim does not have to be the person harassed, but could be
anyone affected by the offensive conduct.
* Unlawful sexual harassment may occur without economic injury
to or discharge of the victim.
* The harasser's conduct must be unwelcome. 39

The EEOC Fact Sheet also explains that "[w]hen investigating
allegations of sexual harassment, [the] EEOC looks at the whole record:
the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances, and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred. A determination on the
allegations is made from the facts on a case-by-case basis." 0 Finally, the
EEOC Harassment page further specifies that, "[fjor inappropriate
behavior to rise to the level of illegal harassment, it must be unwelcome
or unwanted. It must also be severe (meaning very serious) or pervasive
(meaning that it happened frequently)." 4 ' Thus, although the current
guidance regarding sexual harassment claims from the EEOC, the
agency tasked with handling it, is relatively well-defined, the road to
having these protections has been arduous.
A.

Early Case Law-Reed v. Reed and Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson

Understanding the historical legal background providing protection
from sexual harassment and discrimination lays the groundwork for
understanding why the current "severe or pervasive" standard must be
deleted and replaced. As of 1971, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then a law
professor at Rutgers, established the American Civil Liberties Union
Women's Rights Project, which, early on, "was the major, and
sometimes the only, national legal arm of the growing movement for
gender equality, recognized as the spokesperson for women's interests in
the Supreme Court, and the 'premier' representative of women's rights

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Harassment,

U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/harassment (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
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interests in that forum." 4 2 For example, the "Women's Rights Project
challenged the constitutionality of sex discrimination in Reed v. Reed,
where the Supreme Court ultimately extended 'to women equality with
43
men under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
In Reed, the Supreme Court stated that:
The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny
to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to
persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria
wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated

alike."A4
Despite the Court's statements in Reed regarding equal protection,
it was not until 1986 in MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson that the concept
of sexual harassment was formally recognized. Thus, although Title VII
does not explicitly include sexual harassment and discrimination in the
plain language of the statute, the United States Supreme Court formally
recognized the concept in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, when the
Court held that sexual harassment creating a hostile or abusive work
environment was a violation of Title VII."
Understanding the beginnings of a hostile environment claim
solidified in Meritor is critical, as it lays the groundwork for cases and
legal landscape that follows. In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson brought suit
against her employer, Meritor Savings Bank, and Sidney Taylor, the vice
president of that bank, claiming that "during her four years at the bank
she had 'constantly been subjected to sexual harassment' by Taylor in
46
Ultimately, the District Court "found that
violation of Title VII."
[Vinson] 'was not the victim of sexual harassment and was not the
47
victim of sexual discrimination' while employed at the bank."
Additionally, "[a]lthough it concluded that [Vinson] had not proved a
violation of Title VII, the District Court nevertheless went on to address
the bank's liability," and "ultimately concluded that 'the bank was
42. The History of the ACLU Women's Rights Project, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/other/history-aclu-womens-rights-project (last visited Oct. 13, 2021); see
D'Angelo-Corker, supra note 24, at 276.
43. D'Angelo-Corker, supra note 24, at 276 (citing PHYLISS HORN EPSTEIN,
WOMEN-AT-LAW: LESSONS LEARNED ALONG THE PATHWAYS TO SUCCESS 15 (2004)); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971); The History of the ACLU Women's Rights Project, supra note 42.
44. 404 U.S. at 75-76 (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
45.
46.
47.

477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
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without notice and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions of
Taylor."'4 8
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision,
"relying on its earlier holding in Bundy v. Jackson,"4 9 where:
The court stated that a violation of Title VII may be predicated on
either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that involves the
conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and
harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a
hostile or offensive working environment. The court drew additional
support for this position from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR
§ 1604.11(a) (1985), which set out these two types of sexual
50
harassment claims.

The opinion went on to explain that the Appellate Court further
concluded that the claim was of the hostile environment type, and that as
"the District Court had not considered whether a violation of this type
had occurred, the court concluded that a remand was necessary."5" The
opinion explained that the Appellate Court also "concluded that the
District Court's finding that any sexual relationship" between the parties
"'was a voluntary one' did not obviate the need for a remand.""
"'[U]ncertain as to precisely what the [district] court meant' by this
fmding, the Court of Appeals held that if the evidence otherwise showed
that 'Taylor made Vinson's toleration of sexual harassment a condition
of her employment,' her voluntariness 'had no materiality
whatsoever."'5 3 Thus, the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the
judgment of the District Court and remanded the case.54
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari and affirmed "but for
different reasons." 5 The Supreme Court began its analysis by presenting
the plain language of Title VII and explaining that "[t]he prohibition
against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 62.
641 F.2d 934.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). "The court then

surmised that the District Court's finding of voluntariness might have been based on 'the
voluminous testimony regarding respondent's dress and personal fantasies,' testimony that the

Court of Appeals believed 'had no place in this

litigation."' Id.

at 63 (citing Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146

n.36). Moreover, "[a]s to the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that an employer is
absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the
employer knew or should have known about the misconduct." Id.

54. Id.
55. Id.
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minute on the floor of the House of Representatives" with the "principal
argument in opposition" being "that 'sex discrimination' was sufficiently
different from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive
56
The Court further stated that "[t]his
separate legislative treatment."
passed as amended, and we are
quickly
bill
the
defeated,
was
argument
us in interpreting the Act's
guide
to
left with little legislative history
prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'" It was noted that
Vinson argued, "and the Court of Appeals held, that unwelcome sexual
advances that create an offensive or hostile working environment violate
Title VII." 58 The Supreme Court agreed and indicated that,
"[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the
basis of sex." 59 Meritor Savings did not challenge that concept, but
argued, instead, that Congress was more concerned with "'tangible loss'
of 'an economic character,"' however, the Supreme Court flatly rejected
60
that view based on two specific reasons.
First, the Court stated that "the language of Title VII is not limited
to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent
'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women' in employment." 1 Second, "in 1980 the EEOC issued
Guidelines specifying that 'sexual harassment,' as there defined, is a
62
form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII." The opinion went
on to note that the EEOC Guidelines, although "not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance,"63 and that they "fully support the view that harassment
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
707 n.13
62.

Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 64 (citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
(1978)).
The Supreme Court noted that the EEOC guidelines are an "administrative interpretation

of the Act by the enforcing agency." Id. at 65. The EEOC:
[I]ssued guidelines declaring sexual harassment a violation of Section 703 of Title VII,
establishing criteria for determining when unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature
constitutes sexual harassment, defining the circumstances under which an employer may

be held liable, and suggesting affirmative steps an employer should take to prevent
sexual harassment.

Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N (Mar. 19, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/policy-guidance-current-issuessexual-harassment.

63.

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
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leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII."6 The Court further
noted that the EEOC Guidelines define "sexual harassment" by first
describing "the kinds of workplace conduct that may be actionable under
Title VII" and clarified that such conduct included "[u]nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature." 65 The Court went on to state that, relevant to
the instant case:
[T]he Guidelines provide that such sexual misconduct constitutes
prohibited "sexual harassment," whether or not it is directly linked to
the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where "such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment." 66

The Court then stated that, "[i]n concluding that so-called 'hostile
environment' (that is, non quid pro quo) harassment violates Title VII,
the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC
precedent holding that Title VII affords employees the right to work in
an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult." 67 Thus, the Court delineated the two types of sexual harassment
as being quid pro quo harassment ("this for that") and hostile work
environment harassment. 68
The Court in Meritor noted some examples where it was shown that
the protections went beyond economic considerations. For example, the
Court discussed Rogers v. EEOC, which "was apparently the first case to
recognize a cause of action based on discriminatory work
environment" 69 and explained that protections under Title VII go beyond
economic aspects of employment. 70 The Court stated that, in Rogers,
"[t]he Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a Hispanic
complainant could establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that
her employer created an offensive work environment for employees by
giving discriminatory service to its Hispanic clientele."7 1 Specifically,
the Court in Meritor declared that:

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
1971).
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65-66; see Rogers v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66.
Id

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol50/iss1/3

12

D'Angelo-Corker: Severe or Pervasive Should Not Mean Impossible and Unattainable:
20211]

SEVERE OR PERVASIVE SHOULD NOT MEAN IMPOSSIBLE

13

[T]he phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in [Title
VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with
ethnic or racial discrimination .... One can readily envision working
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers ... .72

The Court in Meritor then went on to note that "[c]ourts applied
73
to harassment based on race," and specifically stated that
principle
this
"[n]othing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based on
discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited. The
Guidelines thus appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with,
74
the existing case law."
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that "[s]ince the Guidelines
were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff
may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
75
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The
Court specifically referred to an Eleventh Circuit case, Henson v.
Dundee, where the Court of Appeals stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality
at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can
76
be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.

72. Id. at 66.
73. Id. (citing Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th
Cir. 1977)); see Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (1976). As it pertains to religion,
see Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1976). As it pertains to national
origin, see Cariddi v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8m Cir. 1977).
74. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 892, 902 (1982)). In Henson, the
court discussed a number of elements required to establish a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim, which included that:
[A]n employee must show: (1) that he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) that the
employee has been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature; (3) that the harassment
must have been based on the sex of the employee; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and
create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for holding the

employer liable.
Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11 th Cir. 1999) (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05).
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The Court in Meritor clarified further that not all behavior that may
be referred to as harassment would rise to the level of affecting a "'term,
condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title
VII."77 The severe or pervasive language was solidified as the Court then
stated that, "[fWor sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."' 78 The Court
went on to state that the conduct in this case was sufficient to allow
Vinson to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment. 79 The
Court indicated that the question at hand to be determined was "whether
the District Court's ultimate finding that respondent 'was not the victim
of sexual harassment"' 80 was accurate. The Supreme Court found that
the Court of Appeals correctly found that District Court incorrectly held
as it did based on "two erroneous views of the law." 8
First, the Court stated that the District Court erroneously made its
findings believing that an economic effect had to occur, which was
incorrect, and, thus, never considered the "hostile environment" theory
of sexual harassment. 82 As a result, "the Court of Appeals' decision to
remand was correct."83 Second, the District Court found that there was
no actionable harassment because the relationship was voluntary,
however the District Court should have examined whether or not the
sexual advances were "unwelcome," as that is key to a sexual
harassment claim, not voluntariness. 84 Thus, the Court unequivocally
stated that "[t]he correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether
her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary." 85
Ultimately, "the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the
judgment of the District Court" was affirmed, and the case was
"remanded for further proceedings." 86 Thus, in Meritor, the Supreme
Court laid out that a hostile work environment claim for sexual
harassment or discrimination must be based on unwelcome behavior
which is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive work

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67-68.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.

85.

Id. The court went on to also discuss that agency principles may be relevant with regard to

employer liability. Id. at 70-72.
86. Id. at 73.
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environment against an individual who is in a protected class based on
their gender.
B.

Evolution of the Hostile Work Environment Claim-CaseLaw After
Meritor

Numerous cases came after Meritor, and these cases further
addressed and clarified the requirements for bringing an actionable
hostile work environment claim. For example, in 1993, the Court
granted certiorari in Harris v. Forkift Systems, Inc., to "resolve a
conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as
'abusive work environment' harassment . .. must 'seriously affect [an
employee's] psychological well-being' or lead the plaintiff to 'suffe[r]
injury."'87 In Harris, a former employee filed a Title VII action claiming
that the conduct of the company's president created an "abusive work
environment" as a result of her gender, such that he often directed
unwanted sexual innuendos at her and insulted her based on her
gender.88 The Court began its examination of the conflict among the
Circuits by referencing its holding in Meritor and reiterating the lack of
necessity for an individual to show economic or tangible discrimination
in order to have a valid claim, as the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" language demonstrated Congress' intent to encompass all
disparate treatment of men and women in the employment, not simply
89
that behavior causing economic or tangible loss. The Court firmly
stated that, "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
90
working environment,' Title VII is violated."
Thus, the Court reaffirmed the "severe or pervasive" standard and
clarified further that the standard "takes a middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the
9
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury." ' The Court went on
to further elucidate the standard laid out in Meritor which addressed
both an objective and subjective component, when it stated that:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's

510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id.
87.
88.
89.
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purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII
violation. 92

The Court went on to bluntly state that, "Title VII comes into play
before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown,"9 3 as a
hostile, abusive work environment "can and often will detract from
employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on
the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers." 94 Furthermore,
the Court noted that although the Meritor case laid out numerous
examples of cases showing "especially egregious examples of
harassment,"" they should not "mark the boundary of what is
actionable." 96
Moreover, the Court in Harris unequivocally stated that although
Title VII certainly "bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable
person's psychological well-being," 97 a hostile work environment claim
under Title VII does not require a showing of psychological harm. 98
Thus, the Court held that, "[s]o long as the environment would
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is
no need for it also to be psychologically injurious." 99 The Court further
indicated that as this determination is not concrete, the determination of
whether or not an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" should "be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances." 100 Finally, the
Court stated that such circumstances "may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance,"' 0 1 and
clarified that although "[t]he effect on the employee's psychological
well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff
actually found the environment abusive ... no single factor is
required." 02

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 22-23 (citation omitted).
Id. at 23.

Id

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol50/iss1/3

16

D'Angelo-Corker: Severe or Pervasive Should Not Mean Impossible and Unattainable:
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE SHOULD NOT MEAN IMPOSSIBLE

20211]

17

Then, in 1998, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., the
Supreme Court held that same-sex harassment was actionable under
Title VII in the context of a hostile work sexual harassment claim and
clarified further what type of contact generally would qualify as sexual
harassment or discrimination.0 3 Respondents argued that "recognizing
liability for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general
civility code for the American workplace,"104 however, the Court swiftly
dismissed this argument, indicating that this "risk is no greater for
same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by
05
The Court
careful attention to the requirements of the statute."'
physical
or
verbal
all
prohibit
not
does
VII
clarified that "Title
at
only
directed
is
it
workplace;
the
in
harassment
06 The Court clarified that it
'discriminat[ion]. . . because of ... sex.""
has "never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between
men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely
0 7
but
because the words used have sexual content or connotations,"
laid
rather the Court specified that it more critically focused on the issue
out in Title VII's text which is "whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
08
members of the other sex are not exposed."'
Moreover, the Court went on to state that:
There is another requirement that prevents Title VII from expanding
emphasized
we
As
code:
civility
general
a
into
in Meritor and Harris, the statute does not reach genuine but
innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact
with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. The prohibition
of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor
androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively
09
offensive as to alter the "conditions" of the victim's employment.1

The Court went on to note that in all harassment cases, "the
objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective
of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the
circumstances""" and "that inquiry requires careful consideration of the
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by

103. 523 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1998).
104. Id. at 80.
105. Id.
106.

Id. (alteration in original).

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
Id. at 81.
Id. (citing Harris,510 U.S. at 23).
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its target."'1" The Court clarified that "[t]he real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed.""2 The Court went on to further explain that, "[c]ommon
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive."" 3
The Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton further solidified this
point when it stated that "[a] recurring point in these opinions is that
'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the
'terms and conditions of employment."" 4 The Faragher Court went on
to note that these standards are in place to keep Title VII from becoming
a general civility code, and that "[p]roperly applied, they will filter out
complaints attacking 'the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as
the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and
occasional teasing.'""5
This line of reasoning used in Oncale and Faragher contains
discriminatory considerations at its core, in that it assumes that men and
women "routinely" interact a certain way with "members of the same
sex and of the opposite sex," however this statement is laced with sexist
connotations, as each individual will act how one chooses, not based
solely on their gender."' Additionally, it implies there may be certain
"teasing or roughhousing" among members of the same sex which
should be considered acceptable conduct, despite it being discriminatory
i11. Id.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation omitted). The Faragher/Ellerth defense also resulted

from this case though it will not be discussed in any detail in this Article. In short, the
Faragher/Ellerth defense states that:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending

employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and

correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.

Id. at 807.
115. Id. at 788.
116.

Id.; see also Oncale. 523 U.S. at 81.
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or harassing, yet the standard should not allow for any sexually
17
discriminatory or harassing conduct to be considered acceptable.
C.

Differing Applications of the "Severe or Pervasive" Standard in the
Federal Circuits

Thus, according to the precedent case law from the Supreme Court
discussed above, generally, in order to file a sexual harassment claim
under Title VII, the conduct must be unwelcome, based on the sex of the
employee, and be severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere.' The "severe
or pervasive" standard requires that both an objective and subjective
component be shown." 9 Objectively, the environment must be such that
a reasonable person would find it to be hostile or abusive, while at the
same time, the victims themselves must also subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive. 2 0 Furthermore, a court must look at the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether or not the
2
environment is hostile or abusive,1 ' and some of the factors that should
be examined include: "(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity
of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct
22
unreasonably interferes with the employee's job performance."
Additionally, "the context of offending words or conduct is essential to
the Title VII analysis," 2 3 since "simple teasing, offhand comments, and
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
24
discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment,""
as Title VII does not create a "general civility code" for the
workplace.12 5
Although the general standard for severe or pervasive conduct has
been laid out by the Supreme Court, the "severe or pervasive" standard
has been interpreted quite differently by the federal circuit courts when
those courts are deciding whether the conduct in question satisfies the
"severe or pervasive" standard, and thus creates a hostile work
117. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
118. Mentor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-68 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993); Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc. 915 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2019).
119. See Mentor, 477 U.S. at 67-68; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
120. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
121. Id. at 23.
122. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Allen v. Tyson
Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997)).
123. Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 810 (11th Cir. 2010).
124. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breedan, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
125. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 809.
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environment. Some of the interpretations have created an unreasonably
high bar for victims to meet, as many courts have interpreted the
standard so archaically and narrowly that the holdings are incredibly
insensitive and out of touch with the victim's suffering, such that the
interpretations have led individuals to suffer through unimaginable
circumstances only to be told that the behavior inflicted on them was not
severe or pervasive enough.126 Historically, such a holding is followed
by a weak rationale from a court trying to explain away that although the
behavior was boorish, rude, or inappropriate for a workplace, it did not
rise to the level of being severe enough or did not happen enough times
to warrant a finding of a hostile work environment.1 27
Other jurisdictions seem to be much more willing to contemplate
the suffering faced by the victim and fmd that the "severe or pervasive"
standard should not be an impossible standard to meet. In many of those
instances, conduct that satisfies the standard is typically found to be
severe or pervasive when a court finds that the conduct is humiliating
and/or threatening and truly interferes with the victim's ability to
successfully perform their job.1 2 8 Therefore, a thorough examination of
how the circuit courts have interpreted the severe or pervasive language
over time is necessary to effectively highlight the wildly different
variations in interpretations and, thus, the need to delete the standard and
replace it with a new standard.
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit, in Mendoza v. Borden, reaffirmed
many of the concepts from previous cases and specifically discussed the
requirements for the subjective and objective components of the "severe
or pervasive" standard. For example, the court indicated that "[t]he
employee must 'subjectively perceive' the harassment as sufficiently
severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and
this subjective perception must be objectively reasonable."1 2 9 The court
went on to state that, "[t]he environment must be one that 'a reasonable
person
would
find
hostile
or
abusive'
and
that
'the
victim ... subjectively perceive[s] . .. to be abusive."" 0 The court then
reiterated that the objective severity of harassment "should be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position,
considering 'all the circumstances."" 3' The court then noted that the
"fact intensive" analysis should consider the four factors, which were
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Ijoma & Johnson, supra note 3.
Id.
Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11 th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id.
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identified by the Supreme Court "in determining whether harassment
terms or conditions of
objectively altered an employee's
32
employment."' Thus, the court clarified that "courts should examine
the conduct in context, not as isolated acts, and determine under the
totality of the circumstances whether the harassing conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the
plaintiff's employment and create a hostile or abusive working
environment."' 33
Then, in Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc., in 2010, also in
the Eleventh Circuit, the court reiterated many of the principles and
added to the discussion by indicating that:
[A] member of a protected group cannot be forced to endure pervasive,
derogatory conduct and references that are gender-specific in the
workplace, just because the workplace may be otherwise rife with
generally indiscriminate vulgar conduct. Title VII does not offer
boorish employers a free pass to discriminate against their employees
specifically on account of gender just because they have tolerated
34
pervasive but indiscriminate profanity as well.'

Moreover, the Court went on to clarify though, that, "the context of
offending words or conduct is essential to the Title VII analysis," such
that "[e]ven gender-specific terms cannot give rise to a cognizable Title
35
VII claim if used in a context that plainly has no reference to gender."'
Finally, the court indicated that it was also guided by the principle
"that words and conduct that are sufficiently gender-specific and either
severe or pervasive may state a claim of a hostile work environment,
36
even if the words are not directed specifically at the plaintiff."1 In order
to further clarify what would satisfy the "severe or pervasive" standard,
the court went on to explain that:
It is enough to hear co-workers on a daily basis refer to female
colleagues as "bitches," "whores" and "cunts," to understand that they
view women negatively, and in a humiliating or degrading way. The

132. Id.
133. Id. (citation omitted); see Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808
(11 th Cir. 2010); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001); Allen v. Mich.
Dep't. of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 1999).
134. 594 F.3d at 810 (citing Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999))
("We do not believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-dominated trades relinquishes
her right to be free from sexual harassment.").

135. Id.
136. Id. at 811 (citing Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331-32 (4th Cir.
2003) (en bane) (concluding that Title VII may be violated even when the plaintiff is not
individually targeted); see also Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221-23 (2d Cir. 2004).
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harasser need not close the circle with reference to the plaintiff
specifically: "and you are a 'bitch,' too." 1 37

The court continued this line of reasoning by stating that "words or
conduct with sexual content that disparately expose members of one sex
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment also may support
a claim under Title VII."' 38
Along those lines, in 2019, in Parkerv. Reema Consulting Services,
Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that rumors that an individual slept with her
boss to obtain a promotion satisfied the "severe or pervasive" standard
and was harassment based on sex.1 39 The court found the "severe or
pervasive" standard to be satisfied because "the harassment related to the
rumor was all-consuming from the time the rumor was initiated until the
time [the individual] was fired." 4 0 The court also found that "[t]he
harassment emanating from the rumor also had physically threatening
aspects, even though harassment need not be physically threatening to be
actionable" and "[t]hat this harassment came from [the individual's]
supervisor made it all the more threatening."141
However, in the Eighth Circuit, in 2021, the court admitted that it
has "often noted that our precedent 'sets a high bar' for
'sufficiently severe or pervasive' conduct." 42 For example, in Paskert v.
Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., as recent as 2020, the court noted that
"[t]his court has previously described the 'boundaries of a hostile work
environment claim,' and demonstrated that some conduct well beyond
137.

Reeves, 594 F.3d at 811. The court noted to "See Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d

552, 553-54 [sic] (7th Cir. 2007) [sic] (observing that comments need not be directed specifically at
a person to be discriminatory; comments addressed to the plaintiff's 'target area'-that is, her
protected group-may constitute actionable harassment)." Id.

138.

Id. (citing Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 222) ("[T]he depiction of women in the offensive jokes

and graphics was uniformly sexually demeaning and communicated the message that women as a
group were available for sexual exploitation by men.").

139. 915 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2019).
140. Id. at 305.
141. Id. (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998)) ("[A] supervisor's
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particularly threatening character.");

see also Hernandez v. Fairfax Cnty., 719 Fed. App'x. 184, 187-188 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding the
"severe or pervasive" standard satisfied where supervisor "physically invaded Hernandez's personal
space on numerous occasions and made sexually suggestive comments to her," supervisor informed
various colleagues of his suspicions of victim having an inappropriate relationship with a colleague,
victim repeatedly asked supervisor to stop this conduct, and supervisor monitored movements of

victim).
142. Lopez v. Whirlpool Corp., 989 F.3d 656, 663 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Paskert v.
Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2020)). In Lopez, the court found that the
behavior did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive where an individual touched a victim almost
every time he saw her, despite her repeated requests to stop both directly and to her supervisor,
invaded her personal space, and blew on her finger to fix an injury and called her baby, rather than

letting her obtain first aid. Id. at 660, 663.
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the bounds of respectful and appropriate behavior is nonetheless
43
insufficient to violate Title VII."' The court in Paskert discussed the
McMiller case from 2013 where "the court outlined several cases
illustrating conduct that was not sufficient to amount to actionable
severe or pervasive conduct."'4 The court explained that:
[I]n McMiller we described the facts of Duncan v. General Motors
Corp. in which a supervisor sexually propositioned [the employee],
repeatedly touched her hand, requested that she draw an image of a
phallic object to demonstrate her qualification for a position, displayed
a poster portraying the plaintiff as the "president and CEO of the Man
Hater's Club of America," and asked her to type a copy of a "He-Men
45
Women Hater's Club" manifesto.1

The Paskert court continued, "[t]he court held these facts were not
sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to establish a Title VII hostile
work environment claim."1 46 The court went on to state that,
"in McMiller the court summarized the facts of LeGrand v. Area
Resources for Community and Human Services, where it determined
even more outrageous conduct, including graphic sexual propositions
and even incidental unwelcome sexual contact, did not establish severe
47
Although the
or pervasive conduct sufficient to be actionable."'
behavior "ranged from crass to churlish and were manifestly
inappropriate . .. the three isolated incidents, which occurred over a
nine-month period"1 48 they did not satisfy the standard, as they "were
not so severe or pervasive as to poison [the individual's] work
49
environment."'
Thus, it took overwhelmingly severe or pervasive behavior for the
Eighth Circuit to find the standard satisfied. For example, in Eich v.
Board of Regents for Central Missouri State University, the Eighth
Circuit Court found the conduct to be pervasive enough when over a
[S]even-year period, plaintiff employee was subjected to numerous
instances of sexual innuendo and touching by two male employees,
including several instances of one of the male employees brushing
against her breast, running his fingers through her hair, rubbing her

143. 950 F.3d at 538.
144. Id. (citing McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185, 188-89 (8th Cir. 2013)).
145. Id. (citing McMiller, 738 F.3d at 188) (citing Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d
928, 931-35 (8th Cir. 2002)).
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing McMiller, 738 F.3d at 188) (citing LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human
Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1100-03 (8th Cir. 2005)).
148. LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1102-03.
149 Id at 1103.
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shoulders, and running his fingers up her spine, in addition to standing
behind her and simulating a sexual act while she was bent over during
training sessions. 150

On the other hand, the Second Circuit seems to read the severe or
pervasive language as a much less stringent standard, specifically in
those situations where the incidents are numerous, rather than isolated.
For example, in 2020, the Legg v. Ulster County court ultimately found
that "[d]rawing all reasonable inferences in favor of [the victim], we
have no difficulty concluding that the jury had a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for finding that [the victim] experienced a hostile work
environment at the Ulster County Jail."' 5 This resulted as numerous
female plaintiffs testified that they saw "pornographic magazines
circulated freely and openly among male Ulster County Jail officers, and
numerous
officers-including
supervisors-used
pornographic
screensavers on their work computers."' 52 The plaintiff stated that she
found pornographic magazines in her desk and work area, as well as
"testified about workplace incidents concerning sexual comments and
banter, inappropriate touching, and, in [plaintiff's] case, male officers'
practice of making 'references to my butt [and] references to my chest
and what they would like to do sexually."'153 Additionally, the victim
complained specifically of a co-worker's behavior which included one
incident of putting "his hand around [her] chair and" having "his head
right next to [hers], breathing down [her] neck continuously and he
would come up behind [her] all the time," as well as numerous occasions
of him making inappropriate sexual comments to her.'5 4
Although the Second Circuit seems to have a less stringent
standard, particularly in those situations where the behavior occurs on
numerous occasions, in Redd v. New York Division of Parole, the court
clarified that "[i]solated incidents usually will not suffice to establish a
hostile work environment, although we have often noted that even a
single episode of harassment can establish a hostile work environment if
the incident is sufficiently 'severe."' 155 The court went on to clarify that
150. Harassment,
THOMSON
REUTERS
PRACT.
L.
LAB.
&
EMP.,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/lbbOal49cefD51 le28578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?tr
ansitionType=Searchltem&contextData=(sc.QATypeAhead)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1
(last visited
Oct. 13, 2021) (citing Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 755-56,
758-59 (8th Cir. 2003)).
151. 979 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2020).
152. Id. at 107.
153. Id. at 108.
154. Id.
155. 678 F.3d 166, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing e.g., Pucino v. Verizon Communs., Inc., 618
F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2010)); Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 2010);
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it "must take care, however, not to view individual incidents in
isolation" as the work environment must be viewed using the totality of
56
the circumstances approach.1 Thus, the court held that an issue of fact
existed as to whether or not the conduct was severe or pervasive, when a
female employee alleged that a female supervisor's contact consisted of
57
touching her breast on three separate occasions.
Similarly, in Howley v. Town of Stratford, the Second Circuit
reiterated that "[u]sually, a single isolated instance of harassment will
not suffice to establish a hostile work environment unless it was
'extraordinarily severe. "'158 Thus, here, where a male individual at a
work event berated a female colleague "at length, loudly, and in a large
group in which [the victim] was the only female and many of the men
were her subordinates," and "his verbal assault included charges that
[the victim] had gained her office of lieutenant only by performing
fellatio," the court found that:
It cannot be concluded as a matter of law that no rational juror could
view such a tirade as humiliating and resulting in an intolerable
alteration of [the victim's] working conditions: In an occupation whose
success in preserving life and property often depends on firefighters'
unquestioning execution of line-of-command orders in emergency
situations, the fomenting of gender-based skepticism as to the
competence of a commanding officer may easily have the effect,
among others, of diminishing the respect accorded the officer by
subordinates and thereby impairing her ability to lead in the
life-threatening circumstances often faced by firefighters. 159

The court also stated that the victim presented evidence that the
individual "had perpetrated repeated acts of harassment" after the
original incident "in order to undermine further [the victim's]
subordinates' respect for her, and hence to cast doubt on the degree of
compliance and cooperation she could expect from them."160 Ultimately,

Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir. 2000); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit
Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated in part on other grounds by Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A] single act can
create a hostile work environment if it in fact 'work[s] a transformation of the plaintiff's

workplace."') (quoting Alfano v. Costello 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002)).
156. Redd, 678 F.3d at 176.
157. Id. at 182.
158. 217 F.3d at 153 (citing Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000)); see
also Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992).
159. Id. at 154.
160. Id. at 154-55.
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the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded it to
the district court for trial. 161
In the Tenth Circuit, as far back as 1998, one instance of conduct
was also found to be severe where a customer pulled a waitress's hair,
grabbed her breast, and then placed his mouth on it.16 2 The court stated
that such behavior "was more than a mere offensive utterance" and that
"[g]rabbing [the victim's] hair and breast while she attempted to take
their orders and serve their beer is physically threatening and humiliating
behavior which unreasonably interfered with Ms. Lockard's ability to
perform her duties as a waitress." 163
However, the Seventh Circuit aligns itself more with the high bar
set in the Eight Circuit, as it appears to require an almost insurmountable
standard, as many of the court's decisions appear to be laced with
misogyny and a lack of understanding of sexual harassment at its basic
form. For example, in 1995, in Baskerville v. Culligan InternationalCo.,
employer was entitled to judgment in a case in which the behavior of the
plaintiff's supervisor included making masturbation gestures while
conversing with her, grunting suggestively as she turned to leave his
office, referring to her as a "pretty girl," and commenting that his office
did not get "hot" until she walked in."" "' In Baskerville, the court stated
that "[t]he concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working
women from the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace
hellish for women""' and that "[o]n one side lie sexual assaults; other
physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no
consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating
words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures," 66
while "[o]n the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with
sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers."1 67 The court specified
that what separates the two "is not a bright line . . . this line between a
merely unpleasant working environment on the one hand and a hostile or

161. Id. at 156.
162. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998).
163. Id. The court ultimately held that "looking at all the circumstances, as we must, we are
persuaded that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the
harassing conduct of the customers was severe enough to create an actionable hostile work
environment." Id. (citation omitted).

164. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir.
2018) (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)).
165. 50 F.3d at 430.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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68
Some examples given by the
deeply repugnant one on the other."'
actionable included that
not
was
behavior
the
that
court to try to show

He never touched the plaintiff. He did not invite her, explicitly or by
implication, to have sex with him, or to go out on a date with him. He
made no threats. He did not expose himself, or show her dirty pictures.
He never said anything to her that could not be repeated on primetime
television.'69

Unimaginably, the court went on to state that:
The reference to masturbation completes the impression of a man
whose sense of humor took final shape in adolescence. It is no doubt
distasteful to a sensitive woman to have such a silly man as one's boss,
but only a woman of Victorian delicacy-a woman mysteriously aloof
from contemporary American popular culture in all its sex-saturated
vulgarity-would find [the man's] patter substantially more distressing
than the heat and cigarette smoke of which the plaintiff does not
complain. The infrequency of the offensive comments is relevant to an
assessment of their impact. A handful of comments spread over
months is unlikely to have so great an emotional impact as a
concentrated or incessant barrage.'

70

'

Thus, the Seventh Circuit Court seemed to not only completely
minimize the victim's subjective view of the situation, despite the
requirement that it be part of the analysis, but also to allow the boorish,
intolerable behavior that offends even a reasonable person, and
7
dismissed such behavior as simply annoying "patter."'
Years later, in 2001, the Seventh Circuit, in Worth v. Tyer, seemed
to express a slightly less stringent application of the "severe or
pervasive" standard, but only because the situation involved direct
physical contact. 7 2 Thus, although the court still minimized the verbal
aspects of harassment, when discussing the facts of the case, the court
noted that, "contrary to defendants' assertions, the conduct at issue here
is neither 'tepid' nor 'equivocal.' Rather, a supervisor touching one's
breast near the nipple for several seconds is severe enough to remove
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 431.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Seventh Circuit held similarly in Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. when it upheld

summary judgment for the defendant and stated that "[c]ertainly any employee in Saxton's position
might have experienced significant discomfort and distress at the result of her superior's uninvited
and unwelcome advances," and "[t]hus, although it might be reasonable for us to assume that [the
supervisor's] inaccessibility, condescension, impatience, and teasing made Saxton's life at work
subjectively unpleasant, the evidence fails to demonstrate that his behavior was not 'merely

offensive."' Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1993).
172. See 276 F.3d 249, 267-68 (7th Cir. 2001).
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such conduct from any safe harbor."' 7 3 The court also clarified that
"[t]here is no minimum number of incidents required to establish a
hostile work environment," as "[h]arassment need not be both
severe and pervasive to impose liability; one or the other will do."' 74 The
court went on to state that "[t]he fact that conduct that involves touching
as opposed to verbal behavior increases the severity of the situation,"' 7 5
specifically because "direct contact with an intimate body part
constitutes one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment."' 76
The Seventh Circuit appeared to have made additional
progress, finding in 2009 that "[a] successful hostile work environment
claim based on sexual harassment need not involve sexual conduct, but
can be successful by showing the work environment was sexist. Thus,
this Court has held that a showing of 'anti-female animus' is sufficient to
prevail in a hostile work environment claim."' 77
But then, in 2018, in Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., the Seventh
Circuit continued its practice of ignoring verbal harassment and even
ignored physical contact between parties, which appeared to promote a
culture, and almost acceptance, of sexual harassment in the
workplace.' 78 In Swyear, the victim began working at a company and
found the environment to be "aggressive, disrespectful, and rude," as
many employees and customers were discussed using sexual and
inappropriate nicknames. ' Specifically, she stated that during an
overnight business trip, a colleague who was training her invited her to
dinner, repeatedly touched her arm and lower back, and suggested
skinny-dipping.' 80 Moreover, as the individuals' hotel rooms were
connected, he followed her into her room after dinner, got into her bed,
said that he thought she needed a "cuddle buddy," all while being under
the influence of alcohol.' 8 ' After the victim indicated that she' was tired
and wanted to go to bed, her colleague knocked on her door and called
her on the phone numerous times. 82 Approximately one week after this
incident, the individual participated in a performance review and was

173. Id. at 268; see also id. at 257 (discussing the facts of the case with a heavier emphasis on
the defendant's physical touching of the plaintiff).
174. Id. at 268 (citing Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2000)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 880 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Scruggs v. Garst
Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2009)).
178. Id. at 874.
179. Id. at 878.
180. Id. at 879.
181. Id.
182. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol50/iss1/3

28

D'Angelo-Corker: Severe or Pervasive Should Not Mean Impossible and Unattainable:
2021]1

SEVERE OR PERVASIVE SHOULD NOT MEAN IMPOSSIBLE

29

told to improve her work performance in a few areas and, within thirty
minutes of that meeting ending, she reported what had happened at the
183
Within two
hotel to the company's human resources supervisor.
184
weeks of the meeting, the victim was terminated. The court found that
the harassment was not severe or pervasive such that although "the
environment at [the company] was at times inappropriate and offensive,"
it was not permeated with sexism to create a hostile work
environment.1 85 Specifically, "the nicknames were not directed towards
[the victim], nor were they used to physically threaten or humiliate her.
Rather, they were crude and immature jokes that typically do not result
in employer liability."' 86 Most importantly, the court relied on Hostetler
v. Quality Dining quoting that:
Cumulatively or in conjunction with other harassment, such acts might
become sufficiently pervasive to support a hostile environment claim,
but if few and far between they typically will not be severe enough to
be actionable in and of themselves. A hand on the shoulder, a brief
hug, or a peck on the cheek lie at this end of the spectrum. Even more
intimate or more crude physical acts-a hand on the thigh, a kiss on
the lips, a pinch of the buttocks-may be considered insufficiently
87
abusive to be described as "severe" when they occur in isolation.1

The court went on to state that:
The incident with [the victim's colleague] reflected entirely
inappropriate behavior by a coworker, but does not constitute sexual
harassment alone or when considered with the above-described
incidents. [The victim's colleague's] actions were not severe as
compared with acts this Court has found sufficient to create a hostile or
88
abusive work environment.1

Thus, rather than recognizing the need for change within the circuit, the
court simply used precedent as an excuse for maintaining the status quo
and allowing repugnant behavior to go unpunished.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit was willing to find the "severe
or pervasive" standard satisfied when similar behavior was ongoing. For
example, in Lauderdale v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the
Fifth Circuit court found it to be sufficiently pervasive behavior when
"[t]he plaintiff employee's supervisor called her on the phone at night

183. Id.
184. Id. at 880.
185. Id. at 881.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 882 (citing Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2000)).
188. Id.
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for several months. Even though the calls were not severe or explicitly
sexual (aside from a stated desire to 'snuggle' with the plaintiff), the
conduct was sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile work
environment."' 89 Additionally, in Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LP,
the court found behavior to be pervasive enough when, for example,
over an "entire four-month duration of employment, plaintiff employee
endured almost daily sexual comments and advances from her direct
supervisor, including requests for dates and telling her that her 'butt
looks good." 9 0
Decisions from the remaining circuits have a similar lack of
uniformity and certainty regarding the application of the "severe or
pervasive" standard. As such, the sampling of how the severe or
pervasive language has been interpreted in the federal circuit courts
demonstrates the need for a change to the actual standard itself, as the
application of the current standard has allowed abhorrent behavior to go
unpunished in some jurisdictions and not others, and victims to suffer a
lack of access to justice.
III.

STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATION WHICH REMOVES OR REPLACES
THE "SEVERE OR PERVASIVE" STANDARD

Although sexual harassment and discrimination claims can be
brought under the various laws in each state which prohibit sexual
harassment and discrimination, and, thus, these claims would not fall
under Title VII, the state courts still rely on the "severe or pervasive"
standard when analyzing these claims. However, as a result of the
continued media coverage from the many high profile sexual harassment
and discrimination cases in recent years, a number of states across the
country have been inspired to reevaluate the overly harsh "severe or
pervasive" standard used in sexual harassment cases to determine
whether a lesser or new standard may be more appropriate.1 9 1 Some
examples of criticisms of the standard have included comments such that
the standard is "out of touch with current societal normal and creat[es]
an unnecessary roadblock for victims of harassment to have their claims

189.

Harrassment,supra note 150.

190. Id.
191. Erik A.

Christiansen, How Are the Laws Sparked by #MeToo Affecting

Workplace
Harassment,
A.B.A.
(May
8,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/featured2
articles/ 020/new-state-laws-expand-workplace-protections-sexual-harassment-victims.
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decided by a jury," 92 as well as "that it imposes too high of a burden on
plaintiffs by focusing on whether the conduct 'was really that bad'
93
instead of on whether it 'undermined equal opportunity."" Thus, as of
2019, a number of states have enacted or are considering enacting
legislation to either remove and/or lessen the "severe or pervasive"
standard required in order to file a sexual harassment claim.
A.

CaliforniaFairEmployment and Housing Act Updated

In September 2018, California lawmakers led the way with
providing access to justice to victims of sexual harassment and
discrimination by lowering the burden for bringing a claim in the state,
through approval of Senate Bill No. 1300, Chapter 955, entitled
194
"Unlawful employment practices: discrimination and harassment."
The Legislative Counsel's Digest attached to the bill states that the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") "makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to engage in
harassment of an employee or other specified person .... "'95
Specifically, section 12923, which was added to the Government Code,
begins by explaining the intent of the Legislature "with regard to
96
application of the laws about harassment contained in this part,"'
thereby showing that the legislature wanted its intent for inclusion of the
law to be clear.1 97 Immediately following, subsection (a) of section
12923 goes on to unequivocally state that "[t]he purpose of these laws is
to provide all Californians with an equal opportunity to succeed in the
98
workplace and should be applied accordingly by the courts."'
Subsection (a) further states that:

192. Eric Bachman, A Movement Is Afoot to Redefine Hostile Work Environment/Harassment
6

Laws, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2021, 1:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbachman/2021/01/0
movement-is-afoot-to-redefine-hostile-work-environment-harassment-laws/? sh=2c6e5139337f.

/a-

193. Turnbull & Spinelli, supra note 2.
194. S.B. 1300, 2018 Legis. Counsel (Cal. 2018) ("An act to amend Sections 12940 and 12965
of, and to add Sections 12923, 12950.2, and 12964.5 to, the Government Code, relating to
employment.").
195. Id. It goes on to state that it "makes harassment of those persons by an employee, other
than an agent or supervisor, unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have
known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." Id.

Additionally, "[u]nder FEHA, an employer may also be responsible for the acts of nonemployees,
with respect to sexual harassment of employees and other specified persons, if the employer, or its
agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action." Id.

196. Id. (emphasis added).
197.

Turnbull & Spinelli, supranote 2.

198.

S.B. 1300, 2018 Legis. Counsel (Cal. 2018).
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The Legislature hereby declares that harassment creates a hostile,
offensive, oppressive, or intimidating work environment and deprives
victims of their statutory right to work in a place free of discrimination
when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses,
or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional
tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim's ability to perform the
job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim's
personal sense of well-being.1 99

Thus, this section expands the concept of hostile work environment
to also include environments that are "offensive, oppressive, or
intimidating" and specifically delineates that the harassing conduct in
question must sufficiently offend, humiliate, distress, or intrude upon the
victim. 200 Moreover, subsection (a) further clarifies that the legislature
"affirmed its approval of the standard set forth by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in her concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems [sic]," 201
specifically, that in a workplace harassment suit:
The plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has
declined as a result of the harassment. It suffices to prove that a
reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find,
as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions
as to make it more difficult to do the job.2 02

Most significantly, subsection (b) speaks directly of the "severe or
pervasive" standard and clarifies that "[a] single incident of harassing
conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a
hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiff's work performance or created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 2 03 This
standard appears to be less stringent than the previous "severe or
pervasive" standard required in California. 204 Additionally, it is
199. Id. (citation omitted),
200. Id.; see Turnbull & Spinelli, supra note 2 ("[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, or
isolated incidents that are not extremely serious or pervasive do not rise to the level of unlawful
harassment.").

201. S.B. 1300, 2018 Legis. Counsel (Cal. 2018); see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
202. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25.
203. S.B. 1300, 2018 Legis. Counsel (Cal. 2018).
204. See Kelley v. Conco Co., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("With respect
to the pervasiveness of harassment, courts have held an employee generally cannot recover for
harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial; rather, the employee must show a
concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or a generalized nature.") (quoting Lyle v.

Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 223 (Cal. 2006)); see Herberg v. California Inst. of
the Arts, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that liability for sexual harassment may
not be imposed based on a single incident that does not involve egregious conduct akin to a physical
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important to note that this subsection clarifies that one incident may be
sufficient, which is at odds with many of the rationales in the federal
circuit court cases discussed above. The section further states that:
The Legislature hereby declares its rejection of the United States Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's opinion in Brooks v. City of San
Mateo20 5 [sic] and states that the opinion shall not be used in
determining what kind of conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
constitute a violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act. 206

Thus, the legislature made a definitive move to reduce the conduct
required to satisfy the "severe or pervasive" standard for a claim of
sexual harassment in California.
Subsection (c) goes on to reaffirm that "[t]he existence of a hostile
work environment depends upon the totality of the circumstances and a
discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the context of an
employment decision or uttered by a nondecision maker, may be
relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination." 207 Additionally,
subsection (d) indicates that "[t]he legal standard for sexual harassment
208
as "[i]t is irrelevant that a
should not vary by type of workplace,"
by a greater
characterized
been
have
may
particular occupation
the past." 20 9
in
conduct
or
frequency of sexually related commentary
assault or the threat thereof); Smith v. Nw. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1414 (10th Cir.

1997) ("[I]solated incidents of harassment, while inappropriate and boorish, do not constitute
pervasive conduct.").

205. 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000). In Brooks v. City of San Mateo, the court stated that:
Because only the employer can change the terms and conditions of employment, an
isolated incident of harassment by a co-worker will rarely (if ever) give rise to a
reasonable fear that sexual harassment has become a permanent feature of the
employment relationship. By hypothesis, the employer will have had no advance notice
and therefore cannot have sanctioned the harassment beforehand. And, if the employer
takes appropriate corrective action, it will not have ratified the conduct. In such
circumstances, it becomes difficult to say that a reasonable victim would feel that the
terms and conditions of her employment have changed as a result of the misconduct.

Id.
206. S.B. 1300, 2018 Legis. Counsel (Cal. 2018) (emphasis added); see Turnbull & Spinelli,
supra note 2 (explaining that the new standard in subsection (b) "is a much lower bar than current
California precedent, holding that conduct that is not 'extreme' must have involved "more than a
few isolated incidents" to be unlawful").

207.

S.B.

1300,

Legis. Counsel (Cal. 2018) ("In that regard, the Legislature affirms the

decision in Reid v. Google, Inc. [sic] in its rejection of the 'stray remarks doctrine."'); see

Christiansen, supra note 191 ("Employers in California also may be held liable for harassment
committed by nonemployees if the employer knew, or should have known, of the offending
conduct. Individuals in California also may be held personally liable, along with their employer, for
harassment.").

208.
209.

S.B.
Id.

1300, Legis.

Counsel (Cal. 2018).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

34

[Vol. 50:1

Subsection (d) explains that "[i]n determining whether or not a hostile
environment existed, courts should only consider the nature of the
workplace when engaging in or witnessing prurient conduct and
commentary is integral to the performance of the job duties." 210 This
standard seems to be in direct contradiction 21' with Oncale, which
directs that the "objective severity of harassment should be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position" 212 and
that such "inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in
which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target." 2 1
Thus, subsection (d) presents additional new considerations under this
new law.
Although a number of recent unpublished cases in California,
examining hostile work environment claims in the context of sexual
harassment, have referenced section 12923 since it took effect in late
2018, most of the opinions have chosen to ignore section 12923 or "have
recognized it with seemingly little to no impact on their ruling." 214
However, one case discussing race-based harassment did address the
impact of section 12923 and notably stated that it "codified numerous
opinions concluding a single racial slur can be so offensive it creates a
triable issue as to the existence of a hostile work environment. Thus, the
question is not whether a single, particularly egregious epithet can create
a hostile work environment-under certain circumstances, it can." 2 15
The court, however, then went on to state that, "[r]ather, the pertinent
question is whether the single alleged racial epithet made by Bailey's
co-worker was, in context, so egregious in import and consequence as to
be 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Bailey's]
employment.' 21 6 Consequently, although the court was willing to
recognize that one incident can be enough, it still ultimately indicated
that the "severe or pervasive" standard was the proper standard.
Therefore, it does not appear that the minimization of the severe or
pervasive requirement has yet to have made a large impact on the court's

210. Id. Subsection (d) clarified that "[tlhe Legislature hereby declares its disapproval of any
language, reasoning, or holding to the contrary in the decision Kelley v. Conco." Id.
211. Turnbull & Spinelli, supra note 2 (suggesting that the bill serves as "non-binding statutory
guidance encouraging courts to apply more lenient standards when reviewing harassment claims").

212. 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
213. Id.
214.

See Turnbull & Spinelli, supra note 2; Duran v. Atli. Mem'l Hosp. Assocs., Inc., No.

NC060366, 2020 WL 1698399 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2020); Russell v. City & Cty. of S.F., No.
CGC-15-562245, 2021 WL 1115504 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2021).
215. Bailey v. S.F. Dist. Att'y's Office, No. CGC-15-549675, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 16,
2020).
216. Id.
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analysis in sexual harassment cases, and, thus, the need to make the
change is urgent, as this is a significant step in ensuring adequate access
to justice for victims of sexual harassment.
B.

New York State Human Rights Law Updated

Recently, New York State lessened the requirements for victims of
sexual harassment and discrimination to bring a claim in New York, as
state lawmakers realized the need for additional protections for victims
of sexual harassment and discrimination. Previously, New York State
law followed federal law regarding the conduct required to bring a
claim, as the "severe or pervasive" standard was in place. However, in
August of 2019, legislation was signed by Governor Cuomo "that
strengthened protections against discrimination and harassment,
including sexual harassment, in the New York State Human Rights
Law." 2 17 Ironically, as of early August 2021, Governor Cuomo is now in
the spotlight himself, facing sexual harassment allegations, and is being
2 18
urged to resign with calls coming from as high up as President Biden.
In a New York State Division of Human Rights Press Release dated
October 11, 2019 ("NYS DHR Press Release"), it was noted the:
Division of Human Rights Commissioner Angela Fernandez said "All
workers deserve a work environment free of sexual harassment and
discrimination. The elimination of the 'severe or pervasive' standard
along with other changes, including the requirement that the Human
Rights Law be liberally construed, regardless of any federal rollback of
rights, is a tremendous step forward. The Division of Human Rights
219
will use its powers fully to enforce these important measures."

The NYS DHR Press Release went on to note that Governor
Cuomo originally "proposed these wide-ranging reforms in his 2019
Women's Justice Agenda, and again in his FY 2020 Executive
Budget." 22 0 Then, "[w]hen the initiative was not taken up by the
legislature, and with just 11 days remaining in the legislative session, the
Governor launched the Women's Justice Agenda: The Time Is Now

217. Id. at *3; see also New Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Protections, N.Y.
STATE Div. HUM. RTS. https://dhr.ny.gov/workplaceharassment (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
218. Katie Glueck, Under Fire and Alone, Cuomo Fights for His Political Life, N.Y. TIMES

(Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021 /08/03/nyregion/cuomo-guilty.htm.
219.

Governor Cuomo Announces Sweeping New Workplace Discriminationand Harassment
Today, N.Y. STATE Div. HUM. RTS. (Oct. I1, 2019),

Protections Go Into Effect

https://dhr.ny.gov/new-workplace-protections-effective.

220. Id.
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campaign to urge lawmakers to take action before the close of
session." 22 1
Upon signing the comprehensive legislation, Governor Cuomo
noted that "[t]here has been an ongoing, persistent culture of sexual
harassment, assault and discrimination in the workplace, and now it is
time to act." 222 He went on to strongly state that:
By ending the absurd legal standard that sexual harassment in
workplace needs to be "severe or pervasive" and making it easier
workplace sexual harassment claims to be brought forward, we
sending a strong message that time is up on sexual harassment in
workplace and setting the standard of equality for women.22 3

the
for
are
the

Between August 2019 and August 2020, the provisions of the law
went into effect at varying times. 224 "The legislation strengthened New
York's anti-discrimination laws to ensure employees can seek justice
and perpetrators will be held accountable by eliminating the restriction
that harassment be 'severe or pervasive' in order to be legally
actionable .... "225 The law also mandated "that all non-disclosure
agreements allow employees to file a complaint of harassment or
discrimination" and extended "the statute of limitations for employment
sexual harassment claims filed from one year to three years." 226
According to the Fact Sheet entitled "Important Updates to the New
York State Human Rights Law" available on the New York State
Division of Human Rights website, effective October 11, 2019:
The Human Rights Law now protects victims of harassment, including
sexual harassment, in important new ways:
* Harassment is against the law whenever an individual is
subjected to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.
* The harassment need not be severe or pervasive in order for the
employer to be liable. (However, the employer may raise a

221. Id.
222.

Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Enacting Sweeping New Workplace Harassment
N.Y.
STATE
Div.
HUM.
RTS.
(Aug.
12,
2019),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/goveor-cuomo-signs-legislation-enacting-sweeping-newworkplace-harassmcnt-protections.

Protections,

223. Id.
224. New Workplace Discrimination and HarassmentProtections, supra note 217.

225. Id.
226. Id.
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defense that the actions were not more than "petty slights or trivial
227
inconveniences.")

Specifically, Assembly Bill 8421 ("New York AB 8421") in the
2019-2020 Regular Session amended section 296 of the Consolidated
Laws of New York, Executive, Article 15: Human Rights Law, as
Section 1(h) now reads that:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(h) for an employer, licensing agency, employment agency or labor
organization to subject any individual to harassment because of an
individual's age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation,
gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability,
predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status,
domestic violence victim status, or because the individual opposed any
practices forbidden under this article or because the individual has
filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this
article, regardless of whether such harassment would be considered
severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassmentclaims.228

As the severe or pervasive requirement was explicitly deleted,
Section 1(h) went on to clarify that "[s]uch harassment is an unlawful
discriminatory practice when it subjects an individual to inferior terms,
conditions or privileges or employment because of the individual's
22 9
The
membership in one or more of these protected categories."
lessened standard is more manageable, as it lowers the bar for victims of
sexual harassment and discrimination as to what will constitute
actionable conduct and gives those victims a viable path to justice.
The NYS DHR Press Release went on to highlight that additional
protections in Section 1(h) include that "[i]n order to establish liability,
the complainant does not have to identify a similarly situated
person/employee that was treated more favorably" and that "[a]
complainant does not have [to] complain to their employer or file a
230
These changes from
formal grievance in order to establish liability."

227.

Important Updates to the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. STATE, Div. HUM.

RTs. (Oct. 11, 2019), https://dhr.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/nysdhr-legal-updates-10112019.pdf.
"These measures are central components of the Governor's 2019 Women's Justice Agenda."
Governor Cuomo Announces Sweeping New Workplace Discrimination and Harassment
Protections Go Into Effect Today, supra note 219.

228. N.Y. EXEC. LAW
229. Id.
230.

§ 296(1)(h)

(McKinney 2020) (emphasis added).

Important Updates to the New York State Human Rights Law, supra note 227; see N.Y.

EXEC. LAW

§ 296(1)(h)

(McKinney 2020). The lack of a requirement for filing a formal grievance

appears to do away with the Faragher/Ellerthdefense, as, under this defense, which is available
under the federal law and previously under the New York State law, an employer can escape

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3
38

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

the previous law also ease the requirements imposed on victims when

filing a claim.
Additionally, not only did New York delete the "severe or
pervasive" standard, but it also changed the employers covered, as now
all employers within the state will be bound by the requirements of the
new law, since, effective February 8, 2020, "The Human Rights Law
will apply to all employers within New York State, even those with
fewer than four employees." 231 Specifically, the New York AB 8421
indicated that "Section 1. Subdivision 5 of section 292 of the executive
law, as amended by chapter 363 of the laws of 2015, is amended," 232
such that the definition of employer to "include all employers within the
state, including the state and all political subdivisions thereof." 23 3 This is
far more comprehensive than the federal standard of Title VII, which
applies to those employers with fifteen or more employees. 2 34
Additionally, it should be noted that section 300 of the New York
Executive Law states that the provisions of the article:
Shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial
purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws,
including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the
provisions of this article, have been so construed. Exceptions to and
exemptions from the provisions of this article shall be construed
narrowly in order to maximize deterrence of discriminatory conduct. 235

Thus, it is clear that the intent is for the provisions to be construed more
generously than federal laws, such that greater protections are afforded
to victims of harassment.
liability under certain conditions. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
231. Important Updates to the New York State Human Rights Law, supra note 227. This
protection will have the largest impact on harassment other than sexual harassment, as the previous
version of the law still applied to all employers within the state when sexual harassment was
involved. Previously, the language of the statute read:
The term "employer" does not include any employer with fewer than four persons in his
or her employ except as set forth in section two hundred ninety-six b of this article,
provided, however, that in the case of an action for discrimination based on sex pursuant
to subdivision one of section two hundred ninety-six of this article, with respect to sexual
harassment only, the term "employer" shall include all employers within the state.

N.Y. Assemb. B. 8421 (N.Y. 2019).
232. N.Y. Assemb. B. 8421 (N.Y. 2019).
233. Id. Currently, Executive Law Section 292 states as follows: "5. The term 'employer' shall
include all employers within the state." Id.

234. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(b)

(1964). According to Title VII, section 2000e(b) "[t]he term

'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person .... "Id.

235. N.Y. EXEC. LAW

§ 300 (McKinney

2020).
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Other JurisdictionsConsideringRemoving or Minimizing the
"Severe or Pervasive" Standard

C.

Besides California and New York, other states are considering
removing and/or redefining the standard, to a less stringent standard than
severe or pervasive, in their anti-harassment and anti-discrimination
laws. For example, lawmakers in Maryland, specifically Montgomery
County in Maryland, Colorado, Vermont, and Minnesota have taken
steps to put forth legislation within their states to lower the standard
required in sexual harassment claims, however not all have passed the
legislative process successfully.2 3 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court of
237
Minnesota also recently rejected the change in a case before the court.
1. Maryland and Montgomery County, Maryland
The State of Maryland recently joined California and New York
when it introduced legislation in Senate Bill 834 ("Maryland SB 834")
defining sexual harassment in the context of employment to include:
Conduct, which need not be severe or pervasive, that consists of
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other
conduct of a sexual nature when .. . [b]ased on the totality of the
circumstances, the conduct unreasonably creates a working
environment that a reasonable person would perceive to be abusive or
238
hostile.

This is a substantial change from the previous language which
defined sexual harassment as:
Oral, written, or physical conduct, whether or not the conduct would
be considered sufficiently severe or pervasive under precedent applied
to sexual harassment claims, that consists of unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal, written, or
physical conduct of a sexual nature when ... the conduct has the

Bachman, supra note 192; see Turnbull & Spinelli, supra note 2.
Susan Fitzke, Severe or Pervasive Remains the Standard to Evaluate Claims of Sexual
Harassment in Minnesota, LITTLER (June 5, 2020), https://www.littler.com/publicationpress/publication/severe-or-pervasive-remains-standard-evaluate-claims-sexual -harassment.
236.
237.

238.

S.B. 834, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021). The National Women's Law Center gave "testimony in

support of Maryland Senate Bill 834, disavowing the harmful and outdated 'severe or pervasive'
standard used to evaluate hostile work environment claims and putting in place a new standard to
that better reflects the lived experiences of survivors and modern understandings of workplace
harassment," and the testimony explained "how the 'severe or pervasive' standard used in federal
law and many state laws has been harmful to survivors, especially women of color survivors, and
has led courts to minimize the harmful impact of harassment and throw out many cases." Testimony

in Support of Maryland Workplace Harassment Bill, NAT'L wOMEN's L. CrR. (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://nwlc.org/resources/testimony-in-support-of-maryland-workplace-harassment-bill.
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purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating a working environment that is perceived by
the victim to be abusive or hostile. 239

The legislature left intact the other requirements, such that
"submission to the conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term
or condition of employment of an individual" and "submission to or
rejection or the conduct is used as a basis for employment decisions
affecting the individual." 24 0 Most recently, the legislation received a
favorable vote at the Economic Matters Committee meeting on April 12,
2021.241 Thus, it appears that the legislation is on track for full passage.
Additionally, in October 2020, in Montgomery County Maryland,
in Bill 14-20 ("Montgomery Bill 14-20"), Chapter 27, Human Rights
and Civil Liberties Sections 27-19, the County Council voted to update
the Human Rights Law regarding harassment in the workplace,
removing the "severe or pervasive" standard and replacing it with a less
stringent standard. Specifically, in a memorandum dated September 21,
2020, accompanying the Montgomery Bill 14-20, it was noted that
according to precedent case law in Maryland, "the County may, among
other things, 'decide what will constitute actionable discrimination'
within the County." 24 2 Thus, Montgomery County determined the grave
importance of defining and prohibiting discrimination in employment
under Chapter 27 of their County Code, as it currently "does not define
'discriminatory harassment' or 'sexual harassment' per se, although
these practices generally fall within the County's prohibition against
employment discrimination under Section 27-19."243
Accordingly, the legislature introduced the Montgomery Bill 14-20
which "would alter the level of harassing conduct that constitutes an
employment discrimination claim under County law." 244 The
memorandum highlighted that "[h]arassment would not need to raise to
the level of being 'severe or pervasive' to be actionable; the harassment
would be actionable as long as it was 'more than a petty slight, trivial
inconvenience, or minor annoyance.' 245 Specifically, the Memorandum
noted that "these standards of prohibited harassment would be similar to
those used under a recently enacted law of the State of New York (New

239. S.B. 834, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242.

Memorandum from Christine Wellons, Legislative Att'y to the Health & Hum. Servs.

Comm. (Sept. 24, 2020). See also Montgomery Cnty. B. 14-20 (Md. 2020).
243.

See Memorandum from Christine Wellons, supra note 242.

244. Id.
245. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol50/iss1/3

40

D'Angelo-Corker: Severe or Pervasive Should Not Mean Impossible and Unattainable:
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE SHOULD NOT MEAN IMPOSSIBLE

20211]

41

York Senate Bill 6577, which was signed into law by Governor Cuomo
on August 12, 2019)."246
2. Vermont
Similarly, in the 2019 Annual Report of the Vermont Human
Rights Commission, the commission submitted a recommendation to the
legislature regarding the "severe or pervasive" standard of proof.
Specifically, the recommendation stated that:
The "severe or pervasive" standard of proof for harassment claims by
plaintiffs who have legitimately been affected by harassing behavior
has become a nearly insurmountable barrier to prevailing in a court of
law. The State of Vermont should adopt a standard that is less than
"severe or pervasive," that takes into consideration the impact of
discrimination on victims and does not punish the victim for failing to
247
follow the protocols of the entity.

The recommendations section of the Annual Report went on to also
suggest that "[t]he State of Vermont should consider an amendment to
our existing sexual harassment laws that better defines 'unwelcomed,"'
since sexual harassment is dependent on the conduct being
"unwelcomed" and the "current sexual harassment laws do not reflect
existing power dynamics between parties and the pressures upon a
person whose housing, employment or benefits is conditioned on their
24 8
decision to acquiesce to the advances of those in positions of power."
Thus, the commission, in its "unique position to observe the barriers to
fighting discrimination" in the state, saw the need for the "severe or
24 9
Despite
pervasive" standard to be examined and, ultimately, amended.
this acknowledgement by the Vermont Human Rights Commission for
the need to lessen the severe or pervasive requirement, the legislature
itself in Vermont has yet to act to make any formal change.
3. Colorado
The Protecting Opportunities and Workers' Rights Act, formally
Senate Bill 21-176 ("Colorado SB 21-176"), was recently introduced in
25 0
The
Colorado as a pathway to protection for women while at work.
"all
that
states
21-176
SB
Colorado
of
legislative declaration section

246.
247.
248.

Id.
VT. HUM. RTs. COMM'N., ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR 2019 6 (2019).
Id. at 7.

249. Id. at 6-7.
250. See S.B. 21-176, 73rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
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Coloradans should have an equal opportunity to succeed in the
workplace and are entitled to a workplace that is free from
discrimination and harassment based on their protected status." 25 1 The
section goes on to discuss studies and data showing that despite some
positive "strides in improving workplace environments by making them
free from harassment and discrimination," 2 2 there is still an ongoing
problem which must be addressed to "ensure a safe workplace
environment for all ... ."253
Thus, Section 24-34-400.2.(1)(f)(2), states as follows:
Additionally, the General Assembly:
(a) Finds that the 'severe or pervasive' standard created by courts to
determine if harassment at work is a discriminatory or unfair
employment practice does not take into account the realities of the
workplace or the harm that workplace harassment causes; and
(b) Rejects the 'severe or pervasive' standard for proof of workplace
harassment in favor of a standard that prohibits unwelcome
harassment.

'

Moreover, Colorado SB 21-176 also deletes the language requiring
the finding of a hostile work environment and changes the definition of
"harass" to include subjecting "an individual to unwelcome verbal,
written, or physical conduct,"2 " where the following factors are met: the
individual is a member of a protected class;2 5 "submission to the
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of the
individual's employment,"25 6 "submission to or rejection of the conduct
is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting the individual,"257
or "when taken as a whole, the conduct would be offensive to a
reasonable person in the same protected class or who shares the same or
similar characteristics as the individual subjected to the conduct and was
offensive to the individual."25
Colorado SB 21-176 goes on to require a totality of the
circumstances test be applied when determining whether or not the
conduct was offensive to a reasonable person and to the individual
bringing the claim.25 9 When examining whether it would be offensive to

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See id. § 6.
Id.
Id.
See id. §§ 6, 7.
Id. § 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a reasonable person, the following should be reviewed: "type of
conduct," "nature of the conduct," and "frequency of the conduct,
recognizing that a single act of harassment may be offensive to a
260
When
reasonable person in the totality of the circumstances."
the
individual,
to
the
be
offensive
would
conduct
the
examining whether
review 261 must consist of an examination of the "totality of the
circumstances of the conduct, including: (I) the identity of the individual
engaging in the conduct; and (II) whether the individual who was
subjected to the conduct felt explicit or implicit pressure to condone,
2 62
Finally, Colorado SB
encourage, or participate in the conduct."
21-176 goes on to state that for a claim under this section, "the legal
standard for harassment does not vary by type of workplace. It is
irrelevant that a particular occupation may have been characterized by a
greater frequency of discriminatory conduct in the past" and, most
importantly, that "the conduct does not need to be severe or pervasive to
constitute a discriminatory or unfair employment practice under this
subsection (1)(a)." 263 This standard directly speaks against the "severe or
pervasive" standard and, specifically, disagrees with Oncale and other
decisions by stating that it is irrelevant that a particular occupation was
characterized by discriminatory conduct in the past. Disappointingly,
despite the clear protections afforded in this bill, Colorado SB 21-176
essentially failed on June 7, 2021, as it was postponed indefinitely by the
House Committee on Judiciary. 264
4. Minnesota
In June 2020, in Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., "the Minnesota
Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision affirming that the severe or
pervasive standard remains the test for assessing claims of sexual
265
This
harassment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA)."
came after a rejection in 2019 in the Minnesota Senate of a bill that
266
Despite its
would have replaced the "severe or pervasive" standard.
current
the
discuss
did
court
the
standard,
the
rejection of lessening
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id.

§ 8.

Section 24-34-402(1)(a)(1) describes that "[i]t is a discriminatory or unfair

employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, to
harassment during the course of employment, or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges against any individual otherwise qualified because" that individual is part
of a protected class. Id.
264. Colo. S.B. 21-176, LEGISCAN (Jun. 7, 2021), https://legiscan.com/CO/bill/SBl76/2021.
265. See Fitzke, supra note 237.
266.

Turnbull & Spinelli, supra note 2.
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appropriateness and applicability of the standard, specifically noting
that:
For the severe-or-pervasive standard to remain useful in Minnesota,
the standard must evolve to reflect changes in societal attitudes
towards what is acceptable behavior in the workplace. As we
recognized 30 years ago, the "essence" of the Human Rights Act is
"societal change"; "[r]edress of individual injuries caused by
discrimination is a means of achieving that goal." 267

The court went on to highlight that "[t]oday, reasonable people
would likely not tolerate the type of workplace behavior that courts
previously brushed aside as an 'unsuccessful pursuit of a relationship,'
or 'boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly immature.' 2 68 Despite these
statements
from
the
court
and
although
"[s]ix
different amici participated in filing briefs in support of the plaintiff's
appeal, each asserting that Minnesota should change or discontinue its
longstanding use of the severe or pervasive standard," 2 69 the Supreme
Court still reversed in part and remanded. 270
IV. ELIMINATING NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS AND PROHIBITING
MANDATORY ARBITRATION PROVISIONS ARE POSITIVE CHANGES, BUT
THEY ARE NOT ENOUGH

In conjunction with lessening the "severe or pervasive" standard for
filing a claim to make it easier for victims to sue in state court, states
have also moved forward with "banning the nondisclosure agreements
that predators have used to silence victims and protect their careers,"
prohibiting mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses, and requiring
employee training. 271 Although these changes are being made with
positive intentions, they are not enough and are receiving mixed
responses, as some have pointed out potentially negative impacts with
these changes.
In response to:
[R]eporting about Harvey Weinstein (among others) using
confidentiality agreements to silence victims, Congress in December
2017 amended section 162(q) of the tax code to prohibit 'ordinary and
necessary' business expense deductions for 'any settlement or payment

267. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 231 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted).
268. Id.
269.

See Fitzke, supra note 237.

270. Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 234.
271. See Christiansen, supra note 191.
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related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement or
272
payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement.'

Additionally, "[t]o further curb abuse, state legislatures in California,
New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington have also
adopted different approaches to curtail the use of nondisclosure
settlement agreements." 2 73 The purpose of the restrictions on NDAs is to
forbid employers from using NDAs in settlement agreements with the
goal of resolving sexual harassment claims, though the impacts could
potentially be more far-reaching than intended. For example:
California passed three new laws that impact nondisclosure provisions.
First, a claimant cannot be silenced in California from disclosing
factual information concerning actionable behavior, but a claimant
may elect to keep his or her identity confidential. Second, California
law voids contracts that prevent a party from testifying about
actionable conduct when compelled to do so by lawful process.
Finally, California makes it an unlawful employment practice to
require an employee to sign a nondisclosure agreement that denies the
2 74
claimant the right to disclose information about actionable conduct.

Also, New York, in 2018, amended its laws to prohibit an employer
from including an NDA in a settlement agreement involving a claim of
sexual harassment. 27 The law did, however, leave it up to the
employee's preference, as to whether or not the NDA should be
included, as arguably, there are times that an NDA may protect an
employee. 276 Additionally, the law provides that "any provision in a
contract or other agreement between an employer or agent of an

272. Id.
273. Id. The article highlights that "New Jersey similarly declares confidentiality agreements
that conceal the details of a harassing behavior to be against public policy and unenforceable, while
also protecting a claimant's identity." Id. Additionally, it points out that:
Illinois passed the Workplace Transparency Act, which prohibits any "contract,
agreement, clause, covenant, waiver or other document" that restricts an employee from
reporting allegations of unlawful conduct to federal, state, or local officials for
investigation. Tennessee provides that an employer shall not require an employee to
execute or renew a nondisclosure agreement concerning sexual harassment claims.
Vermont similarly prohibits concealment of sexual harassment facts by agreement.
Finally, Washington voids any nondisclosure agreement that prevents an employee from
disclosing sexual harassment or sexual assaults as a condition of employment.

Id. workplace Transparency Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 101-0220/96/1-25 (2021); see N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-12.7-10:5-12.11 (West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-108 (2021); 21 VT. STAT.
ANN. § 495h (2021); WASH. REV. C. § 4.24.840 (2021).
274. See Christiansen, supra note 191; see also CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (2019); CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE

§ 1002

(2020).

275. N.Y. GEN OBLIG. LAW § 5-336(1)(a) (McKinney 2021).
276. Id. § 5-336(1)(b).
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employer and any employee or potential employee of that
employer ... that prevents disclosure of factual information related to
any future claim of discrimination is void and unenforceable."27 7 An
exception was included, such that a provision may be added as long as it
"notifies the employee or potential employee that it does not prohibit
him or her from speaking with law enforcement, the equal employment
opportunity commission, the state division of human rights, a local
commission on human rights, or an attorney retained by the employee or
potential employee."2 78 Furthermore, some states, including "Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Washington have also passed
laws prohibiting pre-arbitration agreements, class action waivers, and
jury trial waivers in sexual harassment cases." 2 79
Although these statutory attempts are all being made to provide
access to justice to victims, it is unclear whether or not disallowing
NDAs and arbitration agreements is the right path. For example, when
the EEOC's Select Task Force reconvened in June of 2018, "Kathleen
McKenna, a partner at Proskauer Rose, who represents employers,
testified that arbitration provides a neutral and confidential process to
resolve individual harassment complaints for conduct that employers
'invariably prohibit and work to guard against. "' 280 In her testimony, she
"also explained that proposals to prohibit non-disclosure agreements are
likely to be counterproductive, as that could lead to an increase in
litigation rather than private resolution." 28 1
Others have also argued that NDAs can protect employees during
an ongoing dispute and should not be completely dismissed. For
example, "[d]iscoverable facts can be embarrassing and harmful to both
parties. Therefore, it is often desirable for both parties to utilize an NDA
so that neither side must publicly respond to the other's version of
events." 282 Additionally, it may be true that, "[e]mployers that feel they
cannot seek an NDA that preserves their good name will be less inclined
to consider settlement in the first place or include clauses that benefit the
employee as part of the resolution." 283 Thus, this could lead to victims
losing a settlement option that may otherwise have been available.
277. Id. § 5-336(2).
278. Id.
279. See Christiansen, supra note 191.
280. EEOC Select Task Force on Harassment Hears from Experts on How to Prevent
Workplace Harassment,supra note 1.

281. Id.
282. Emily Haigh & David Wirtz, #MeToo: In Defense of NondisclosureAgreements, LITrLER
(Feb.
26,
2020),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/metoo-defensenondisclosure-agreements.

283. Id.
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Additionally, others have argued that "now clients will wonder whether
they should fight instead of settle because there is no way to obtain
confidentiality" and that this "might lead to attempts to circumvent the
statutes by, for example, dropping the sexual harassment claims and then
settling."2 84 Although settlement is, at times, the best option, it may not
always be, yet these statutory provisions may make settling a more
appealing, though less advantageous, solution for the victim. Despite the
attempts by states to limit or prohibit employers from requiring
employees to sign NDAs as a condition of employment or as part of a
settlement, prohibiting provisions regarding arbitration agreements, and
28 5
requiring anti-harassment training for employees and employers,
changes still need to be made to ensure that all states protect victims of
sexual harassment by ensuring access to justice for those individuals.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite some of the current positive changes being made by
legislatures and employers, the most effective way to provide access to
justice for victims and put would-be harassers on notice that harassment
and discrimination will not be tolerated is to lessen the "severe or
pervasive" standard. Sexual harassment continues to be a serious
problem in the workplace, such that victims suffer emotional, economic,
and professional consequences with often zero to, at best, limited
recourse. Thus, the "severe or pervasive" standard applied in sexual
harassment claims should be deleted or altered to create a less stringent,
more realistic standard, in line with today's societal and workplace
conditions and dynamics.
As noted, the "severe or pervasive" standard has been interpreted
quite differently by different courts and some of those interpretations
have led to outrageous outcomes. For example, many jurisdictions have
set an unreasonably high bar for victims to meet, and, in those
jurisdictions, outcomes have led individuals to suffer through situations
involving unimaginable harassment and discrimination, only to have the
court hold that the behavior was not severe or pervasive enough to
qualify as conduct which created a hostile work environment. These
holdings are not only insensitive to the individual's suffering, but they
284. See Christiansen, supra note 191. The article was quoting David Gevertz, Atlanta,
Georgia, cochair of the ABA Section Leader of the Employment & Labor Relations Law Committee
who stated that, "[t]he pendulum has swung, and confidentiality provisions have been abused by
powerful people with deep pockets who can afford to buy silence," however, he also noted that "I
would have preferred courts to have been more liberal in permitting discovery, rather than enacting

legislation." Id.
285.

JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 2.
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lay the groundwork for a continued disregard to the harassment and
discrimination suffered by individuals in the workplace.
For example, "[w]hen a survivor brings a harassment lawsuit,
courts should consider all the ways the employer harassed the survivor. Instead of viewing events in their totality, under the 'severe or pervasive' standard, judges often parse apart each instance of harassment and consider each in isolation."28 6 As such, "[j]udges applying the
standard determine whether the conduct is egregious or frequent enough,
and their own biases and experiences can impact the analysisleading cases to be dismissed before they are fully and fairly heard by a
jury." 287 "This framework minimizes survivors' experiences and the impact of harassment at work." 288 Once the "severe or pervasive" standard
is deleted or altered, and replaced with a new, more clear-cut, practicable
standard, it can be more uniformly applied.
Thus, each state should pass legislation to replace the "severe or
pervasive" standard with a more appropriate standard, such as has been
done in New York or California. For example, the New York statute
defines harassment as "an unlawful discriminatory practice when it
subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because of the individual's membership in one or more of
these protected categories."2 8 9 The California statute similarly provides
that:
[H]arassment creates a hostile, offensive, oppressive, or intimidating
work environment and deprives victims of their statutory right to work
in a place free of discrimination when the harassing conduct
sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim,
so as to disrupt the victim's emotional tranquility in the workplace,
affect the victim's ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise
interfere with and undermine the victim's personal sense of

well-being. 29

0

Such language provides a more appropriate standard, as an individual
must be subjected to inferiority, oppression, or intimidation to bring a
claim (rather than severe or pervasive conduct), which are at the core of
why sexual harassment and discrimination is so damaging.
Although the potential lack of effect of changing the language has
been noted, the potential benefits outweigh these concerns. For example,

286.

Ijoma & Johnson, supra note 3.

287.
288.
289.
290.

Id.
Id.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(h) (McKinney 2021).
S.B. 1300, 2018 Legis. Counsel (Cal. 2018).
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David Gevertz, the Atlanta, Georgia cochair of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") Section Leader of the Employment & Labor
Relations Law Committee, stated that "[w]eakening the substantive legal
standard to require less than the federal 'severe or pervasive' standard in
state court will not change the results," as "[p]laintiffs' lawyers can
already avoid the federal 'severe or pervasive' standard by pleading state
law claims for assault, battery, negligent hiring, and negligent
supervision." 2 9 ' Although these other legal options may be available to
attorneys, lowering the "severe or pervasive" standard does more than
simply change the outcome in a particular case. Rather, it sets the
standard at a manageable level and shows plaintiffs that their claims will
be properly acknowledged and shows potential offenders that
over-the-top harassing or discriminatory behavior will no longer be
tolerated.
Additionally, Gevertz opined that "[j]urors are sensitive to the news
about celebrities, and during moments like the present, juries tend to
become more liberal in their verdicts, regardless of whether the standard
is 'severe or pervasive' or not." 292 Thus, he indicated that "[j]urors will
fine-tune the standards in ways that outstrip the laws," and that "jury
justice is much more efficient than legislative justice. Changing the laws
is an inefficient way to get the same result."2 9 3 Contrary to this opinion,
although legislation is a slower process, hoping that juries find in favor
of victims because of a change in societal views is a frightening,
uncertain way to proceed with providing justice for a victim. As is clear,
a jury is an unsure piece of an equation, as it can change each day and on
a whim. Changing the "severe or pervasive" standard lays the
groundwork for alerting would-be offenders to the fact that they must
behave in a certain way, otherwise their victim will have the right to
bring the claim to court.
Additionally, it has been noted that the new laws may increase
litigation, though this may not necessarily be a negative result, as:
The outdated "severe or pervasive" standard leads many survivors to not
make a complaint or seek help for fear their claims will not be legally
actionable. Given the bad court interpretations that have come out of
"severe or pervasive," these concerns are not unfounded. Placing this
burden on plaintiffs does little to incentivize employers to create safe
2 94
and harassment-free workplaces.

291.

See Christiansen, supra note 191.

292. Id.
293. Id.
294.

Ijoma & Johnson, supra note 3.
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Thus, lowering the standard puts the burden on employers to create an
environment that will foster a harassment- and discrimination-free
environment.
Finally, another route that has been taken to combat sexual
harassment and discrimination, which will work in conjunction with the
lessening of the "severe or pervasive" standard, is to require that
employers implement programs and conduct sexual harassment
prevention training for employers and employees. For example, as a
result of the Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the
Workplace, and as part of the Report of the Co-Chairs Chai R. Feldblum
and Victoria A. Lipnic, the EEOC included an Anti-Harassment Policy
checklist and a Harassment Report System and Investigations checklist
which were each meant to be a useful tool in taking steps to prevent
harassment in the workplace, and responding to harassment when it
occurs. Also as a result of the EEOC Report, as of the 2018 reconvening
of the EEOC Committee "the EEOC developed an innovative training
program called Respectful Workplaces that has been provided in over
200 training sessions to over 5,200 employees and supervisors in 18
states." 95 Moreover, some states, such as California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, and New York have enacted new training
requirements concerning sexual harassment and discrimination.296
Although such trainings can serve as a means of preventing harassment
before it happens, it is first important to change the "severe or
pervasive" standard, as it will stand as a deterrent to would-be harassers
that such behavior will be punished and lay the proper groundwork for
putting employers on notice, as well.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is imperative that all states enact laws to change the "severe or
pervasive" standard to a less stringent and more realistic, current
standard to ensure that their citizens have adequate access to justice
within their borders for sexual harassment and discrimination claims and
to put would-be harassers on notice that harassment and discrimination
will be punished.

295. FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 23. EEOC Select Task Force on HarassmentHearsfrom
Experts on How to Prevent Workplace Harassment,supra note 1. Also, the Press Release noted that
"[s]ince June 2016, when the report was released, the EEOC has also conducted about 2,700
outreach events related to harassment, reaching approximately 300,000 individuals." Id.

296. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 2018); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12950.1(a) (2018); CONN.
AGENCIES REGS. § 46a-54-204 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 807(3) (2016); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-g
(McKinney 2021).
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